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CIVIL RIGHTS AFTER FIVE YEARS
BERL I. BERNHARD*
,When the United "States Commission on 'Civil Rights com-
menced operations in the spring of 1958,1 the Nation was beginning
to' develop an awareness of discontent on the part of its major'
minority group. Negro Americans, their hopes raised by the
Supreme Court's School Segregation decisions,' were beginning
to rise and throw off what many of them considered to be the yoke
of official oppression.
The Congress, disturbed by the many conflicting statements
which filled the air daily, had charged the Commission with studying'
legal developments which allegedly constituted denials of equal pro-
tection of the laws and reporting its findings to the American people
through their elected representatives with "recommendations for
future, if any, legislation" needed to secure "equality for all and
equal protection of the laws for all."'
In 1958, the law clearly protected individuals denied their civil
rights in the following situations:
(1) The courts had declared the unconstitutionality of formal
exclusion of Negro Americans from any part of the electoral
process.4 Neither could more rigid qualifying standards be applied
to Negroes seeking to register to vote than to whites.
(2) Government-enforced segregation in public schools had
been recognized to be violative of the right to equal protection of the
laws.6
* Staff'Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Resigned on Nov. 1,
1963 to enter private practice of law with firm of Verner & Bernhard, Wash-
ington, D.C.
'Although the Commission had been established on September 9, 1957, 71
Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1958), the appointment of its first Staff
Director was not confirmed until May 14, 1958. 104 CONG. REc. 8677(1958).
' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'See H.R. RrP. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 8 (1957). See also
71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-75e (1958).
'Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
5 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board
of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938).
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(3) Government zoning to create or maintain residential segre-
gation had been held to be invalid.7 Judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants had been prohibited.' Two federal courts of
appeal had held segregation in publicly owned housing to be uncon-
stitutional.
(4) The federal executive had required federal contractors to
agree to refrain from discriminating' ° and prohibited discrimination
in federal employment."
(5) Federal criminal and civil sanctions were available in cases
where civil rights had been denied.' 2 Exclusion of Negroes from
jury service was prohibited and held to be sufficient grounds for
reversal of a conviction.'4
(6) Discriminatory practices by interstate carriers had been
judicially declared to be an undue burden on commerce.' 5 Nor
City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930); Harmon v. Tyler,
273 U.S. 668 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
'Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). While the Court in
Shelley did not expressly conclude with the Department of Justice that
only "those actions of individuals which are in no respect sanctioned, sup-
ported, or participated in by any agency of government are beyond the scope
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" (Brief for the U.S. Dept. of
Justice as amicus curiae, p. 52) (Emphasis added.), it did reaffirm the
blanket unreasonableness of color-conscious real property law. See Henkin,
Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473(1962).
'Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.
1956); Detroit Housing Comn'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955).
"Exec. Order No. 10479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953); Exec. Order No.
10308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1951); Exec. Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183
(1943).
"
1Exec. Order No. 10590, 20 Fed. Reg. 409 (1955); Exec. Order No.
9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1948).11218 U.S.C. §§241-242 (1958); Rev. Stat. §1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1958) ; Rev. Stat. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. 1985 (1958) ; Rev. Stat.
§ 1981 (1875); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1958).18 18 U.S.C. §243 (1958).
1" See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) ; Reece v. Georgia,
350 U.S. 85 (1955); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Shephard v.
Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950);
Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 (1948) (five cases); Patton v.
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939) ; Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938) ; Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295
U.S. 394 (1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Carter v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900) ; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882) ; Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880).
'
8Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) ; Morgan v. Virginia,
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could intrastate carriers be required to segregate.1" The Interstate
Commerce Commission required interstate carriers to desegregate
terminal facilities."
(7) The government's obligation to desegregate its facilities
had been established by the Court.' 8  But the Civil Rights Act of
1875,19 intended to impose a similar obligation upon operators of
non-governmentally connected places of public accommodation, had
been held unconstitutional except as it might apply to situations in
which state action could be found.2
During the next five years, the scope of individual protection
expanded considerably.
I. VOTING
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was the first positive congressional
measure in the field of civil rights since 1875. Its purpose was "to
provide means of further securing and protecting the civil rights
of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."'" In addi-
tion to establishing the Commission on Civil Rights, it authorized
the federal government to bring civil suits in its own name to obtain
injunctive relief when any person is denied or threatened in his right
to vote. Prior to this time, injunctive relief was available only
to private persons, many, of whom were unable to bear the expense
of protracted and complex litigation.22 The new law gave the federal
district courts jurisdiction of injunction suits without requiring
that state remedies first be exhausted. Under its new authority, the
Department of Justice instituted suits in Macon County, Alabama,
Terrell County, Georgia, and Washington Parish, Louisiana.28
328 U.S. 373 (1946); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941). It
is interesting to note that the Court in Hendersoo, indicating that racial
classification was, per se, an undue burden on commerce, referred the reader
to a fourteenth amendment higher education case, McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), decided the same day.
"6 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala. 1956):
"
7NAACP v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 297 I.C.C. 335 (1955); Keys v. Caro-
lina Coach Co., 64 M.C.C. 769 (1955).1 " Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, reversing 223 F.2d 93 (5th
Cir. 1955); Baltimore v. Dawson, 350' U.S. 877, affirming 220 F.2d 386
(4th Cir. 1955).
1? Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
" Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
" Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1958).
"Act of Apr. 20, 1871; ch. 22, § 1, REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§19.83 (1958).
"
2United States '-. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 267
[Vol. 42
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In the Georgia case the Government charged that certain voting
registrars, through wrongful acts and in violation of the Georgia
registration laws, had failed to register qualified Negro voters solely
because of their race or color. The federal district court ruled that
the enforcement provision of the 1957 act, as written, might be used
against private persons who were depriving citizens of their right
to vote and was thus unconstitutional and beyond congressional
power.24 But the Supreme Court, finding that the defendants in
that case were, in fact, not private persons but state officials, re-
versed. 5 It went on to uphold the Attorney General's standing
to sue, saying:
[T]here is the highest public interest in the due observance of
all the constitutional guarantees, including those that bear the
most directly on private rights, and we think it perfectly compe-
tent for Congress to authorize the United States to be the
guardian of that public interest in a suit for injunctive relief.26
The Louisiana case was resolved by the determination of the Georgia
case.
The Alabama case was not so simply disposed of. Registrars in
Macon County, Alabama, had successfully avoided federal action
under the 1957 act by resigning two months before the commence-
ment of the suit. The district judge refused to allow the suit to be
maintained against the state, ruling that it was not a "person" sub-
ject to the act.2"
This ruling, together with the persistent refusal by some local
officials to let federal investigators examine registration and voting
records, led the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to recommend
that the act be strengthened.. The Commission suggested that an
affirmative duty to act be'placed on registrars and that records be
preserved for a five-year period and subjected to federal inspection.
The Commission also recommended that federal officers be appointed
F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated, 362 U.S. 602 (1960) (per curiam);
United States v. Raines, 172 F. Su'pp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd, 362
U.S. 17 (1960); United States v. McElveen, 177, F. Supp. 355 (E.D. La.),
180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La. 1959), aff'd sub worn., United States v. Thomas,
362 U.S. 58 (1960) (per curiam).
2A United States v, Raines, 172 F. Supp. 552, 562 (M.D. Ga. 1959).
2 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
20 Id. at 27.
"7 United States v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala. 1959).
19631
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to register Negro applicants where local officials engaged in dis-
criminatory practices."
The Civil Rights Act of 1960 provides that discriminatory acts
of registrars "shall also be deemed that of the State and the State
may be joined as a party defendant." If a registrar resigns a "pro-
ceeding may be instituted against the State." The act further
requires that voting records be preserved for twenty-two months
following any general, special, or primary election. It permits
the Attorney General to gain access to them for "inspection, repro-
duction, and copying" before filing suit in order to determine
whether proceedings are warranted.29
Under the present law if a district court, in a proceeding insti-
tuted under the 1957 act, finds a "pattern or practice" of voting
deprivation, it can appoint one or more federal voting referees to
receive applications from prospective voters who alleged that they
have been denied an opportunity to register or otherwise qualify
to vote. If the referee agrees that the prospective voter is qualified,
he reports his findings to the court, which may issue a decree order-
ing that the qualified voter be permitted to vote.30
Enforcement of the two civil rights acts proceeded with new
vigor. Late in 1960, the Justice Department acted on reports of
economic coercion of Negroes who had attempted to vote in Hay-
wood County, Tennessee. The complaints charged that eighty
defendants, including named merchants, landowners, banks, and
local officials, intimidated, threatened, and coerced Negro citizens
to keep them from voting in federal elections. The alleged methods
of intimidation included evictions of sharecroppers and tenant
farmers, firings of employees, denials of loans by the banks and
credit by the merchants, and direct threats. In May 1962, a federal
court permanently enjoined the defendants from interfering with
2 U.S. CoMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, REPORT 1959, at 134-42 [hereinafter
cited as 1959 Comm'N REPoRT].
' Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (1960), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1974
(Supp. 1962).
" The Act also strengthened the measures available to the federal govern-
ment for dealing with obstructions of federal court orders and bombings
and burnings of schools and churches.
In 1962 Congress proposed a constitutional amendment to abolish the
poll tax, a requirement existing in only five southern states. If ratified by
38 states within seven years, it will become the 24th amendment to the
Constitution. 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4033-41. As of July 2,
1963, 36 states had ratified it. 109 CONG. REC. 11393 (daily ed. July 2,
1963).
[Vol. 42
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voting by Negroes."' A similar suit in Fayette County, Tennessee,
was similarly decided on July 26, 1962.32
A suit was brought by the Attorney General on January 19,
1961, on behalf of a Louisiana Negro cotton farmer who allegedly
could not get his cotton ginned, could not sell his soybean crop, and
could not buy butane gas to run his farm because he had testified at
a Civil Rights Commission hearing on voting denials in Louisiana.
The defendants stipulated on February 3, 1961, that they would do
business with the farmer."3
On December 28, 1961, the Department of Justice filed a suit
to prohibit the use of a Louisiana voting "test" which required
prospective voters to "interpret" the state constitution to the satis-
faction of the registrars who administered it. 4 On June 16, 1962,
the department filed a suit in federal district court in Jackson, Mis-
sissippi, asking that the court order school officials in Greene County,
Mississippi, to renew the contract of a Negro school teacher who
was dropped from employment after she tried unsuccessfully to
register to vote and then gave testimony about those efforts in a
civil rights suit.3 5
On July 24, 1962, 26 Negroes from East Carroll Parish in north-
east Louisiana were registered as voters by Federal Judge Edwin
F. Hunter, Jr. in the first proceeding of its kind under the 1960
Civil Rights Act.38 On August 28, 1962, the Department of Justice
filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Jackson,
Mississippi. It asked the court to declare unconstitutional two sec-
tions of the Mississippi Constitution which require interpretation
tests and "good moral character" requirements and made a similar
request concerning seven state laws which set up other devices
allegedly used to discriminate against prospective Negro voters.3T
In all, 45 cases have been brought by the Attorney General; 16
"United States v. Beaty, 7 Rc REL. L. REP'. 484 (W.D. Tenn. May 2,
1962). See also United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
"United States v. Atkeison, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 487 (W.D. Tenn.
July 26, 1962).
"United States v. Deal, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 474 (W.D. La. Feb. 3,
1961).
8, United States v. Louisiana, - F. Supp. - (E.D. La. 1962).
"United States v. Board of Educ., 7 RAcE RE. L. REP. 770 (S.D. Miss.
Aug. 30, 1962).
" New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 25, 1962, p. 11. See United States
v. Manning, 206 F. Supp. 623 (W.D. La. 1962).
" United States v. Mississippi, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Miss. 1962).
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in Mississippi, 11 in Louisiana, 10 in Alabama, 4 in Tennessee, and
4 in Georgia.38
On February 23, 1963, a three-judge court in the Western Dis-
trict of Louisiana upheld the constitutionality of the 1960 act. The
court concluded:
The object of the Act is to guarantee to qualified voters the right
to register and vote. That end is within the scope of Article I,
Section 4 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; the
corrective registration plan embodied in Section 1971(e) is an
appropriate means to accomplish the end. Congress has taken
pains to accommodate the Act to States' Rights. For example,
the Act does not affect the qualifications fixed by the State and no
State registrar is replaced by a federal registrar. It is not for
this court to inquire whether the statute is good or bad, or
whether state laws are adequate or inadequate for dealing with
the problem. The States must make an accommodation too. To
the extent a conflict exists, the Supremacy Clause requires the
States to yield to the will of the nation.3 9
II. PUBLIC EDUCATION
When Little Rock High School opened for the September 1957
term the Governor of Arkansas attempted to avoid court-ordered
segregation by directing the National Guard to prevent Negroes
from entering the school.4" At the court's request, the Attorney
General filed a petition asking that the Governor be enjoined from
further acts to obstruct compliance with the court's order and the
Governor, pursuant to court order, withdrew his troops. 1 In
1958, the court of appeals sustained the Government's standing to
appear in these cases "to prevent its orders and judgments from
being frustrated and to represent the public interest in the due ad-
ministration of justice."4  Later in the year the Supreme Court,
at one of its rare special terms, declared:
[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated
against in school admission on grounds of race or color . . . can
"U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT, CIVIL RIGHTS '63, at 37-50
(1963).
,United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 289 (W.D. La. 1963).
"The Governor's proclamation stated that troops were dispatched "to
accomplish the mission of maintaining or restoring law and order and to
preserve the peace, health, safety, and security of the citizens ... ." Procla-
mation of Governor Faubus, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 937 (Sept. 2, 1957).
"I United States v. Faubus, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 958 (E.D. Ark Sept. 20,
1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).
"Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797, 805 (8th Cir. 1958).
(Vol. 42
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neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or
state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by
them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted
"ingeniously or ingenuously." 43
In the last stage of the Little Rock suit, the court of appeals barred
the leasing of public property to a private school system which was
formed to operate public schools closed by the Governor.44
In 1959 the Supreme Court of Virginia decided, after action
had been brought by white parents seeking the reopening of public
schools in Norfolk, that the state school closing laws violated the
Virginia Constitution. Today, Prince Edward County, Virginia,
stands as a lone monument to the device of school closing.
The chief means for limiting desegregation today is the pupil
placement or assignment law. These laws have been used by school
boards to assign all Negro pupils initially to Negro schools. Negro
pupils who apply for transfer in order to escape segregation are
met with elaborate screening and testing procedures. Those who
are rejected must exhaust administrative remedies. Few have had
the stamina to complete this complex ritual.46
But in 1962, the minimal desegregation resulting from the ad-
ministration of pupil placement and other plans led the courts to
a closer scrutiny of their implementation. One court of appeals
stated:
This Court . . . condemns the Pupil Placement Act when,
with a fanfare of trumpets, it is hailed as the instrument for
carrying out a desegregation plan while all the time the entire
public knows that in fact it is being used to maintain segregation
by allowing a little token integration. 47
Another device for limiting desegregation was voided in June 1963,
the Court declaring that "no official transfer plan or provision of
which racial segregation is the inevitable consequence may stand
under the Fourteenth Amendment."4
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
"Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1958).
"Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959).
482 U.S. Co!MM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, REPORT, EDUCATION 1961, at 76-77
(1961); 1959 CoMM'N REPORT 240.
'" Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 1962).
8 Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963). See McNeese v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). With the enforcement of the decisions
in Meredith v. Fair, 202 F. Supp. 224 (S.D. Miss.), motion for injunction
pending appeal denied, 305 F.2d 341 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 305 F.2d 343 (5th
19631
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Progress continues to be slow in the South. The Supreme
Court's warning that a pace found acceptable for desegregation nine
years ago will not necessarily satisfy the Court today may soon be
reflected in lower court rulings.49
III. HOUSING
On November 20, 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued an
Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing." The order
directed federal agencies to act to prevent discrimination in the sale
or rental of "residential property and related facilities" owned by
the federal government, or aided or assisted by it after November
20, 1962. Agencies were ordered to issue regulations, adopt policies
and procedures, and enforce nondiscrimination-first through con-
ciliation, then through the imposition of sanctions.
Thereafter, the Federal Housing Administration ruled that it
would deny benefits to persons and firms which discriminate; not
affected by its action was one or two-family owner-occupied housing.
It required insurance applicants to agree in writing to comply and
corporations owning FHA-insured apartment houses to guarantee
nondiscrimination in their charters. The agency provided a pro-
cedure by which complaints of discrimination may be heard by local
directors and, if necessary, appealed to Washington."1
The Public Housing Administration required local public
agencies contracting for loans or annual contributions after No-
vember 20, 1962 to agree to operate low-rent housing projects and
related facilities on a desegregated basis.52
Cir.), order for stay vacated, mandate recalled and new mandate issued,
306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962) ; Gantt v. Clemson
Agricultural College, 208 F. Supp. 416 (W.D.S.C.), complaint dismissed,
213 F. Supp. 103 (W.D.S.C. 1962), rezvd with instructions to order admis-
sion, 320 F.2d 611 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEic 3386
(U.S. May 21, 1963) ; and Lucy v. Adams, 8 RAcE. Rmt. L. REP. 448 (N.D.
Ala. June 5, 1963), the last three states to resist the quarter century struggle
to desegregate public institutions of higher learning in the South formally
succumbed. See also United States v. Wallace, 218 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ala.
1963).
'" Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
"0 Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
12 FHA MANUAL, §§ 200.300-355; 27 Fed. Reg. 11548, 11802, 12126
(1962); 28 Fed. Reg. 1540 (1963). The Veterans Administration (VA)
has also prohibited discrimination and provided that violators may be denied
future VA benefits. 27 Fed. Reg. 11669 (1962). Because of discriminatory
practices, VA stopped doing business with a Chicago real estate broker in
April, 1963 and a Florida builder in July, 1963.
"' PHA Circular Letter. Nov. 28, 1962.
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The Urban Renewal Administration required local public
agencies to agree, in loan and grant contracts entered into after
November 20, 1962, not to discriminate. These agencies were also
required to agree to place a covenant prohibiting discrimination in
deeds conveying project land. Violators are subject to contract
cancellation, denial of future benefits, or court actions for covenant
enforcement. The administration later required local public agencies
to develop affirmative programs to expand housing opportunities
for minority groups.
5 3
The Community Facilities Administration strengthened the non-
discrimination provision in its senior citizen housing loan agree-
ments and added a clause in its college housing loan agreements.54
The Department of Defense required nondiscrimination clauses
in leases for military housing and limited listings of off-base housing
to open occupancy units.55 The Farmers Home Administration,
Department of Agriculture, required that mortgages closed after
December 14, 1962, contain a nondiscrimination covenant, violation
of which "shall constitute default under the mortgage . . .-.
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare required
applicants for surplus property to be used for housing to agree not
to discriminate.57  The Area Redevelopment Administration, De-
partment of Commerce, required that applicants agree not to dis-
criminate in housing and related facilities, with the exception of
hotels and other transient facilities.58
Existing housing, not directly subject to the order's prohibitions
except when Government-owned,- is covered by a provision enjoin-
ing agencies "to use their good offices and to take other appropriate
action permitted by law, including the institution of appropriate liti-
gation, if required," to abate discrimination. Two complaints filed
with FHA under this provision were rejected without further action
after attempts at conciliation failed.5" A private suit against the
58URA, Local Public Agency Letter No. 256, Nov. 30, 1962; URA, Equal
Opportunity in Housing; Policies and Procedures, Apr. 24, 1963, p. 7; URA,
Local Public Agency Letter No. 273, July 22, 1963.
" HHFA, CFA News Release No. 62-1396, Dec. 5, 1962.
" Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNarmara to the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 8 RAcE REI. L. REP. 325(March 8, 1963).
5'27 Fed, Reg. 12611 (1962).
'27 Fed. Reg. 12753 (1962).
z628 Fed. Reg. 119 (1963).
Letter from FHA Commissioner to Roland E. Barnes, Jan. 11, 1963;
letter from FHA Commissioner to Karl D.'Gregory, Mar. 29, 1963.
1963]
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owners of an allegedly "white only" motel built on urban renewal
land was decided on July 30, 1963 in favor of the Negro petitioner. 60
A federal district court ruled that, because of the significant extent
of government involvement in urban renewal, the existing privately
redeveloped housing and related facilities must be available on an
equal basis. The Department of Justice has yet to institute litiga-
tion under this provision of the order.
IV. EMPLOYMENT
Experience with earlier Executive orders requiring nondiscrim-
ination in federally connected employment revealed weaknesses.
Employers were being required to take action to afford equal op-
portunity only when specific complaints were made. Federal
agencies were frequently in the position of investigating themselves.
No President's committee could be effective until it was made clear
that sanctions would be imposed against agencies and contractors
which refused to comply.
In an effort to overcome these weaknesses, President Kennedy,
in 1961, created the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity with Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson as Chair-
man."- The President said:
I have dedicated my Administration to the cause of equal
opportunity in employment by the Government or its contractors.
The Vice President, the Secretary of Labor and the other mem-
bers of this committee share my dedication. I have no 'doubt that
the vigorous enforcement of this order will mean the end of such
discrimination.
62
Unlike its predecessors, the committee has authority to investigate
complaints, issue recommendations and orders, and require recon-
sideration of final decisions by department and agency heads.
The order creating the committee directs each contracting agency
to include a nondiscrimination clause in Government contracts and
require contractors and subcontractors to submit compliance reports
at regular intervals. The committee is authorized to order a con-
tracting agency to terminate its contract with a noncomplying
contractor or to refrain from entering into a contract with a
" Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn.
1963).
" Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
2 White House Release, Mar. 6, 1961.
[Vol. 42
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potential contractor who has a record of noncompliance. It may
declare a noncomplying contractor ineligible for further Government
contracts. It may also require prospective contractors or sub-
contractors to submit compliance reports for any previous contracts
covered by the order. The committee may hold hearings on and
investigate the practices and policies of labor unions involved in
Government work. Reports on the cooperation of labor unions and
recommendations for securing their cooperation are made periodi-
cally to the President.
In addition to its assigned duties, the committee has secured the
voluntary cooperation of major Government contractors in pro-
grams which go beyond the minimum requirements of the order.
In the first two years of the new administration some 85 contractors
employing 4.3 million workers signed "Plans for Progress""8 which
pledge equal opportunity for all qualified persons regardless of race,
color, religion, or national origin.
On June 22, 1963, President Kennedy extended the authority
of this committee .to cover any federally assisted construction
project, whether by grant, loan, contract, insurance, or guaranty,
and empowered it to withhold federal funds from any project in
which workers are discriminated against.64
V. TRANSPORTATION
In May 1961, the "Freedom Rides" began. Late that month the
Attorney General petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission
to adopt more stringent regulations against segregation in waiting
rooms, rest rooms, and eating places in interstate bus terminals.,
On September 22, 1961, the commission prescribed new rules pro-
hibiting discrimination in seating on interstate buses66 and requiring
that each bus display a sign stating: "Seating aboard this vehicle is
without regard to race, color, creed, or national origin, by order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission."' 7
:'N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1962, p. 35, col. 1.
6' Exec. Order No. 11114, 28 Fed. Reg. 6435 (1963).
" Dept. of Justice Release, May 29, 1961. In Boynton v. Virginia, 364
U.S. 454 (1960), the Supreme Court had held that, where circumstances
show that a bus terminal and restaurant operate as an integral part of a bus
carrier's transportation service for interstate passengers, the restaurant, al-
though not owned, controlled, or operated by the carrier, is in interstate com-
merce and may not refuse to serve Negro passengers.
6649 C.F.R. § 180a.1 (Supp. 1963).
'49 C.F.R. § 180a.2 (Supp. 1963).
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The signs were posted until January 1, 1963. Since that time,
a similar notice has been required on bus tickets,"' no interstate bus
company has been permitted to use a segregated terminal,"0 and a
sign containing the anti-discrimination regulations has been required
to be conspicuously displayed in each interstate bus terminal.1 0
By 1962, the law had become so clear that the Supreme Court
was able to announce: "We have settled beyond question that no
State may require segregation of interstate or intrastate transporta-
tion facilities. .. . The question is no longer open; it is foreclosed
as a litigable issue."71
VI. GOVERNMENT FACILITIES
The Supreme Court in three 1963 decisions again reaffirmed that
no municipally owned and operated facilities72 may be segregated
and no unreasonable delay will be allowed in effectuating their de-
segregation. In Johnson v. Virginia,7" the Court said that "it is
no longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally
require segregation of public facilities. ' '7sa In Wright v. Georgia,
the Court held that a municipality cannot arrest and prosecute
Negroes for peaceably seeking the use of city-owned-and-operated
recreational facilities.
In a third case, Watson v. City of Memphis," a desegregation
plan was submitted by the Memphis Park Commission and ap-
proved by a lower court. The plan provided for the gradual de-
segregation of Memphis' recreational facilities, including parks,
849 C.F.R. § 180a.3 (Supp. 1963).
" 49 C.F.R. § 180a.4 (Supp. 1963).
" 49 C.F.R. § 180a.5 (Supp. 1963). When the new rules went into effect
on November 1, 1961, open defiance was reported in Georgia, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. The Department of Justice responded by filing a series of suits
in Louisiana and Mississippi to enforce the new regulation. Dixon, Civil
Rights in Transportation and the I.C.C., 31 GEo. WAsHr. L. REv. 198, 23240
(1962).
7'Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962) (per curiam). A few
weeks later the Court made it clear that this principle also applied to airport
facilities. Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam).
" In 1961, the Court had 'expanded its interpretation of "municipally
owned-and-operated," holding that a privately owned restaurant in a munici-
pally owned parking garage in Wilmington, Delaware, could not refuse
service on the basis of race or color. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
78 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam).
731 Id. at 62.
74373 U.S. 284 (1963).
7373 U.S. 526 (1963).
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swimming pools, and playgrounds, over a period of ten years. The
Court rejected the plan and ordered prompt desegregation declaring
that the "basic guarantees of our Constitution are warrants for the
here and now and, unless there is an overwhelmingly compelling
reason, they are to be promptly fulfilled."75a_
VII. PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMODATION
On February 1, 1960, four college students in Greensboro, North
Carolina, entered a variety store, made several purchases, sat down
at the lunch counter, ordered coffee, and were refused service because
they were Negroes. They remained in their seats until the store
closed. In the spring and summer of 1960 young people, both
white and Negro, participated in similar protests against segrega-
tion and discrimination. Many were arrested for trespassing, dis-
turbing the peace, and disobeying police officers who ordered them
off the premises. The charge in the latter type of cases was fre-
quently predicated upon the assumption that, while the demon-
strators had been orderly, their conduct could have provoked a
breach of the peace by others. However, the mere "possibility of
disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place
if they otherwise have a constitutional right (founded upon the
Equal Protection Clause) to be present. ' 76  The exercise of the
first amendment freedoms of speech and assembly cannot be abridged
"unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest." 77
Having disposed of the first sit-in cases on evidentiary grounds, 8
the Supreme Court in May 1963 considered the question whether
the arrest and conviction of protesters peaceably seeking desegre-
gated service represents unlawful "state action" within the reach of
the fourteenth amendment in a series of cases from Greenville, S.C.,
New Orleans, Birmingham, and Durham.79 The protesters had
7 Id. at 533.
"'Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963); accord, Taylor v.
Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962) (per curiam); Garner v. Louisiana, 368
U.S. 157, 174 (1961).
" Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963).7'Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962) (per curian); Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
"°Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober v. City of
Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963) (per curiam); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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been convicted, not for breach of the peace, but for trespass on the
private property of those who operated restaurants and lunch coun-
ters. Confronted with an apparent conflict between the proprietors'
property rights and the protesters' right to be free from state-
enforced segregation, the Court found state action and reversed the
convictions.
Three of these cases ° involved laws requiring operators of
eating places to segregate. Although not directly invoked, these
laws were found to have left such operators no choice but to segre-
gate. The Court held that the use of the state's criminal processes
to arrest and convict the protesters had the effect of enforcing the
segregation laws and was consequently prohibited state action in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In the fourth,"' where there was no law requiring segregation in
eating places, the Court ruled that city officials' public statements
that attempts to secure desegregated service would not be permitted
had the same effect as segregation laws.
Many cities and states either do not have or have repealed
segregation laws. Many officials either have never made or have
stopped making public statements committing the state to main-
tenance of segregation. This has brought to the Court the broad
question of whether the state has any right to arrest and prosecute
protesters for seeking equal access to places of public accommoda-
tion. 2
In situations such as the sit-ins, protesters acted to secure im-
mediate desegregated use of a facility. But different problems may
be presented when protesters engage in street demonstrations against
discrimination in general. One such incident occurred in March
1961, when 187 Negro students marched on the South Carolina
State House to make their grievances known to the public and the
legislature, which was then in session. Refusing to disperse, they
" Avent v. North Carolina, supra note 79; Gober v. City of Birmingham,
supra note 79; Peterson v. City of Greenville, supra note 79.81 Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
The following cases, presenting this issue were argued during October,
1963: Robinson v. Florida, 144 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1962), probable jurisdiction
noted, 374 U.S. 803 (1963); Bell v. Maryland, 227 Md. 302, 176 A.2d 771
(1962), cert. granted, 374 U.S. 805 (1963); Griffin v. Maryland, 225 Md.
422, 171 A.2d 717 (1961), restored for reargunent, 373 U.S. 920 (1963);
City of Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S.C. 750, 124 S.E.2d 332 (1962), cert.
granted, 374 U.S. 805 (1963); City of Columbia v. Barr, 239 S.C. 395, 123
S.E.2d 521 (1961), cert. granted, 374 U.S. 804 (1963).
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were arrested and convicted for breach of the peace. Their appeals
were decided by the Supreme Court in February 1963. The Court
found that the protesters had been orderly, that they had not ob-
structed pedestrian or vehicular traffic, and that there had been no
clear and present threat of violence by bystanders which the police
were unable to control. Reversing the convictions, the Court held
that "in arresting, convicting, and punishing the petitioners under
the circumstances disclosed by this record, South Carolina infringed
the petitioners' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free
assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of grievances." 3
VIII. CONCLUSION
We all have a personal and critically important stake in this
struggle to close the gap between the proclamation of freedom and
its practice in America. As we struggle with our enemies without,
we must build additional strength within. To let our heritage be
eroded means the fall of what the Great Emancipator so aptly called
"the last, best hope of earth."
The issue is nothing less than this. The law demands it. We
have the guarantees written into the Constitution which the Supreme
Court, in Watson v. Memphis s4 has made clear are "warrants for
the here and now," and "not merely hopes to some future enjoy-
ment of some formalistic constitutional promise." 5 Morality pleads
for it. All the world's great religions forbid discrimination and
demand adherents to right such wrongs. Our economy argues for
it. The Negro as a consumer has more potential for American
business than Canada or the Netherlands; bringing his average
salary to parity with the white man could add twenty billion dollars
to the gross national product. National survival cries for it. We
have been badly wounded in our international struggle with Com-
munism by the comparison of our practices with our avowed prin-
ciples.
In the true spirit of our American heritage, an independent
judiciary has led us far along the road toward the realization of
" Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). For a case
involving protest demonstrations in the downtown business district of an-
other city in South Carolina, see Fields v. South Carolina, 240 S.C. 366, 126
S.E.2d 6 (1962), vacated and remanded, 372 U.S. 522, aft'd, 131 S.E.2d 91
(S.C.), petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3070 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1963).
8'373 U.S. 526 (1963).
Il Id. at 533.
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equality before the law. The challenge of our times is whether we,
independently as individuals and collectively as a Nation, will
demonstrate the maturity to walk that road, to translate judicial
promise into living reality, and to write an honorable ending to one
of the least proud chapters in American history.
